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Abstract: !e goal of the study is to analyse whether Chinese Mainland companies were paying 
higher premiums for similar target companies in Europe in comparison with Europe-based companies 
during the period of 2000-2013. To determine the di"erence between premiums paid by Chinese 
and European companies, two samples were analysed: one represented all Chinese acquisitions in 
Europe which matched the set criteria, another included comparable European targets acquired by 
European companies. Quantitative research methods were applied to measure statistical di"erence in 
the premiums of the two samples. Results of the research indicate that the average premiums paid by 
Chinese companies are double the size of the European acquisition premiums for the similar target 
company in Europe. Signi#cant evidence suggests that premiums of Chinese and European companies 
for similar targets in Europe are not equal. 
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Introduction 
In this global economy, companies are looking for possibilities to expand their 
businesses to foreign markets and one of the possible ways to do this is through mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). !e total value of M&A in 2013 was US$ 2215bn, with US$ 
774.4bn coming from cross-border deals. In comparison with 2012, the market was 
slightly contracting in the USA and Europe, but growing very fast in Asia. 
China as one of the booming emerging markets is showing a growing interest  in 
cross-border M&A. !e volume of Chinese outbound M&A deals rose by 40-50 times 
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since the year 2000, and currently China is one of the leading countries in Asia by this 
parameter. Chinese companies’ appetite is especially growing in developed countries – 
Europe, the USA and Australia. 
Most of the research on M&A is focused on motives and value creation, thus these 
topics are quite well covered. However, premiums paid in M&A transactions and 
premium drivers seem to be still new and uncovered phenomena. Researchers found 
out that acquiring #rms from emerging economies compared to those from developed 
economies have a tendency to o%er higher premiums in order to acquire assets in 
developed countries. However, there is no unanimous opinion among researchers 
whether premiums, in particular paid by Chinese acquirers, can be justi#ed. !erefore, 
this paper analyses premiums paid by Chinese acquirers in M&A transactions in Europe. 
!e study aims to investigate whether Chinese Mainland companies in comparison 
with Europe-based companies were paying higher premiums for the acquisition of 
similar target companies in Europe during the period of 2000-2013. It reviews the 
previous research carried out on the topic of M&A premiums, analyses Chinese M&A 
in Europe, compares Chinese and European premiums paid for similar targets in 
Europe and the factors which might have in+uenced the sizes of these premiums, as 
well as identi#es the main M&A motives and premium drivers for Chinese companies.
Quantitative research methods are used to examine the di%erence between the 
premiums paid by Chinese and European companies during M&A transactions in 
Europe. At #rst, the sample of Chinese deals is determined and for each Chinese deal a 
comparable set of European deals is identi#ed. !en the comparison between premiums 
paid by China-based and Europe-based companies for similar targets in Europe is made. 
Other factors which might have in+uenced the di%erence in sizes of premiums paid by 
Chinese and European companies are identi#ed and examined as well. 
!is paper is organised as follows: the #rst section reviews the literature on the topic 
of M&A, in particular premiums and peculiarities of Chinese deals. Next, the methods 
to be applied are indicated and a description of samples is provided. In the third 
section, a comparison between the premiums paid by Chinese and European acquirers 
for similar targets in Europe is presented. !e in+uence of premium determinants on 
Chinese and European acquisition premiums are also described in the third section. In 
the last section, conclusions are made and directions for future research on the topic 
are provided.
1. !eoretical Research on M&A and their Premiums
Companies are always looking for new possibilities to expand, and one of the ways to 
enter a new market is through M&A. Results from the KPMG International (2013) 
research revealed that executives prefer acquisition strategy among others (e.g., joint 
venture, green #eld investment, alliance) due to the speed of entering the market and 
observed excellent opportunity. M&A strategy is believed to be more advantageous 
if the #rm is seeking to enter a desired market where well-established incumbent 
enterprises exist and where global competitors are a/empting to move (Wang, 2009). 
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Types of M&A. Most authors classify M&A into 3 main types – horizontal, 
vertical and conglomerate. John C. Narver (1967) noticed that sometimes it is hard 
to distinguish whether companies are related or not, and therefore o%ered a new 
de#nition: conglomerate merger is any merger in which two or more products in the 
merger neither compete nor are vertically related’. !us, if by acquiring a new #rm, the 
bidder gains new external geographic or external product market, this merger can be 
called conglomerate (Narver, 1967). 
While some of the authors di%erentiate only horizontal, vertical and conglomerate 
mergers, others try to extend classi#cation of conglomerate merger further. George G. 
Aragon (1989) divided conglomerate mergers into 3 subgroups – product extension, 
market extension and others. Conglomerate merger falls into the category of product 
extension if combined companies have functionally related production but their 
products are not competing, e.g., shoes manufacturer and clothes manufacturer. Market 
extension occurs when companies are manufacturing or selling similar products in 
di%erent geographic locations. Others refer to ‘pure’ conglomerates where merging 
companies are related neither by geography nor by product (Aragon, 1989). 
Following this de#nition, most of the Chinese acquisitions in Europe are expected 
to fall under the conglomerate class, while European companies’ deals in Europe might 
be a/ributed to any of these classes. Motives of M&A are also expected to be di%erent 
depending on the class into which the merger falls.   
Motives of M&A. Rationale for M&A was examined by many authors. Arnold 
(2005) suggested classifying motives into 4 groups – synergy, bargaining power, 
managerial motives and third party motives. Another way of classifying M&A motives 
is by intrinsic and extrinsic motives (Skinner, 1953; Deci & Koestner, 1999). !e third 
model suggests dividing motives into valid and questionable motives (Emery, Finnerty, 
Stowe, 2004). !e la/er reasoning appears to be contradictory because what is 
considered to be a valid motive in one type of business could be a questionable motive 
in another one and vice versa. 
Even though researchers seem not to have a unanimous opinion on what is the 
most appropriate classi#cation model, one model stands out from the rest due to its 
simplicity and clarity. R. Schoenberg (2006) classi#cation model which is commonly 
used in M&A analysis divides motives into strategic, #nancial and managerial classes. 
According to the researcher, strategic motives for mergers include extension of business, 
change of competitive structure and improvement of business capabilities. However, 
the list is incomplete. !e preemptive motive, which suggests that a company engages 
in an acquisition because it is afraid that the competitor might acquire the same target 
company, also belongs to the strategic class (Molnar, 2007). Financial e<ciency, tax 
e<ciency, asset stripping or unbundling are the three #nancial motives. Investment 
opportunity motive can be assigned to the same class as sometimes acquisition is 
made just because the target is undervalued (Damodaran, 2011). !us, the #nancial 
e<ciency class should be extended. Managerial motives are those that  serve the 
managers’ interest rather than that of shareholders. According to Schoenberg (2006), 
there are two managerial motives – personal ambition and bandwagon e%ect. 
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!e Schoenberg classi#cation model does not cover well the motives that are 
interrelated with more than one type of motives. Besides, external motives are hardly 
taken into consideration. Researchers argue that technological, economic and regulatory 
shocks (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996), #nancial variables (Giovanni, 2005), customers 
and suppliers (Ahern & Harford, 2010) a%ect M&A signi#cantly. !erefore the authors 
of this paper present an extended model of classi#cation of the motives for M&A 
(Figure 1). 
FIG. 1. "e extended Schoenberg model for classi#cation of motives for M&A 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on R. Schoenberg (2006)
According to the surveys, strategic motives are the most important ones. KPMG 
International research (2013) suggests that the most popular rationales for acquisitions 
are consolidation and extension. Other 2 common motives are #nancial e<ciency and 
investment opportunity. However, the results of the study are based on the surveys of 
the management of the merging companies. !erefore it is hard to measure the impact 
of managers’ self-interest due to managers’ reluctance to admit and share discrete 
information.
Wang and Moini (2012) investigated Danish #rms and obtained the results similar 
to KPMG International (2013); they found that two main motives are strategic ones 
– extension and capabilities. Financial e<ciency took the third place. Both Wang and 
Moini (2012) and the KPMG International (2013) studies showed that managerial 
motives are not among the most popular ones.
!e acquisition motives of Chinese companies are similar to the motives of any other 
acquirer. Boateng, Qian and Tianl (2008) research results were consistent with KPMG 
International (2013) and Wang and Moini (2012) results and showed that strategic 
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motives for Chinese M&A are the main ones encouraging M&A deals. Detailed results 
of the study are depicted in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Strategic Motives for M&A of Chinese Firms
Motivational factor Number Percentage
To facilitate international expansion/diversi#cation 17 39.0
To increase market share/power 12 27.0
To acquire strategic asset – technology & knowhow 12 27.0
To overcome trade barriers 3 7.0
Total 44 100.0
Source: Boateng, Qian and Tianl (2008).
Acquirers expect to increase their market share, enter new market or gain know-
how. Financial motives, such as investment opportunity or economies of scale are also 
a popular explanation for M&A. However, as all studies were based on surveys of the 
managers, the underlying motives for transactions such as managerial hubris are hardly 
explored. 
"e concept of value and price in M&A. Value and price in M&A are frequently 
mixed terms. According to Price Waterhouse Coopers (2013), value is the individualistic 
perception of the worth of a company which is di%erent for di%erent buyers and sellers. 
Fernandez (2004) distinguished six di%erent types of valuation methods: balance 
sheet based, income statement based, mixed, cash +ow discounting, value creation and 
option based methods. All of these methods have their advantages and disadvantages. 
!e majority of authors stress the importance of discounted cash +ow model 
(Damodoran, 2011; Fernandez, 2004). According to Imam, Barker and Clubb (2008), 
discounted cash +ow model is most frequently used by buy-side #nancial advisers. 
On the other hand, many authors admit that it is impossible to calculate the ‘correct’ 
value because in discounted cash +ow approach a lot of estimations and assumptions 
have to be used (Damodaran, 2011). Additionally, this method is complicated, time 
consuming, subjective and requires inside information (Havnaer, 2012). 
Relative valuation is well appraised by many authors as it represents not only the 
value of the target company but also the condition of the whole market (Damodoran, 
2011; Fernandez, 2004). With the help of various market multiples, it is possible to 
compare di%erent M&A deals. 
Market capitalisation of a company or the price at which listed companies shares 
are sold on the stock exchange is the most commonly used valuation method for 
calculating premiums (Hayward & Hambrick 1997; Gupta & Misra, 2007; Varaiya & 
Ferris, 1987; Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013). !is valuation concept is popular due 
to the data availability, simplicity and objectiveness. !us, to be consistent with other 
relevant researches on acquisition premiums (Hayward & Hambrick 1997; Gupta & 
Misra, 2007; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987; Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013), further research 
will assume that value of a target company’s share is the listed stock price prior to the 
acquisition announcement. 
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In the majority of M&A, price contains the value of the target company to the 
acquirer plus a premium. Price is the monetary expression of stock or cash which 
was used to pay for the target company (Fernandez, 2004). !e price of the deal is 
usually paid with a premium on the price at which the target’s shares are traded in the 
market (Emery, Finnerty & Stowe, 2004). Sometimes M&A deals are completed with a 
discount. Discount could alert that currently the company is overvalued and it originally 
had a lower value in M&A market or that management of the target company is weak 
(Roll, 1986). Normally, the potential acquirer compares the value (what a company is 
worth to the acquirer) to the current market price and if the value is below the price, the 
bid is abandoned (Roll, 1986). 
Premiums. An acquisition premium is a ratio of the negotiated price of one target’s 
share and the price at which the target’s share is traded in the market (Laamanen, 2007; 
Sirower & Sahni, 2006). !is premium is sometimes called a control premium in the 
acquisitions of publicly traded companies (RSM Bird Cameron, 2010; Komiak, 2010). 
However, Damodaran (2011) argues that it is a premium paid for the acquisition, 
but not a control premium. !e researcher states that a control premium appears as the 
acquirer believes it could make signi#cant impact on the target company. Conversely, 
premiums for acquisitions can be paid for many reasons, and control is just one of them. 
Besides, acquirers tend to overpay (Damodaran, 2011). !us, agreeing with Damodaran 
(2011), a premium paid for acquisitions should not be referred to as a control premium. 
Research revealed that a high acquisition premium could be dangerous for the 
acquirer because it may overweight all the synergies acquisition might create (Sirower & 
Sahni, 2006; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987). !ere are many cases when the premium paid was 
too high and because of that the deal did not create additional value to its stakeholders. 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) stated that premiums paid for the acquisitions are negatively 
related with acquirers’ returns and can still have an impact a>er up to four years. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) found in their research that shareholders of 
the acquiring #rm lost 12 cents on every dollar spent on acquisition during 1998-2001 
in the United States. !e accumulated total loss was about $240 billion. 
Even though many studies revealed that high acquisition premiums frequently 
destroy value (Sirower & Sahni, 2006; Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2005), 
companies continue to pay high premiums. !omas Reuters report indicates that the 
world average premium for all industries in 2012 was 31.2% and 30% in 2013 (!omas 
Reuters, 2013). 
As a result, a natural question arises as to what  the major premium drivers are. A 
number of determinants were identi#ed by the existing literature in an a/empt to justify 
the sizes of the premiums (Figure 2). One explanation for the large premium could be 
that the stock on the stock exchange does not represent the real value of the company 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Having performed comprehensive due diligence analyses of 
the potential target, acquirers might have a deeper understanding of the real value of 
a target #rm than the market (Laamanen, 2007). However, similarly to the acquirer 
who notices the target’s potential for value creation, the market can also recognise the 
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undervalued potential of the companies  to be acquired. !us, market prices might be 
adjusted with the possibility of acquisition even before the acquisition is announced 
(Crawford & Lechner, 1996).
Assuming that a company on the stock exchange is priced fairly, there are many 
other determinants for the high premiums. One of the speculative determinants for 
the size of the premium is believed to be managerial hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997). Managers of the acquiring companies are willing to bid high to complete the 
deal. Research (Aktas, Bodt & Roll, 2011) proved that if the manager completed 
a few successful transactions in the past, he will tend to overpay for a new target 
company. Recent performance of the company, media praise and CEO self-con#dence 
have a positive e%ect on premiums (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).  Agarwal and 
Zeephongsekul (2013) state that acquirers who are risk takers  pay relatively more than 
the risk averse acquirers. !ere exists a contradictory opinion that premium is the result 
of either a valuation error or managerial hubris (Roll, 1986).
Varaiya and Ferris (1987) noticed that overestimation of acquisition gains could 
cause higher premiums as well. Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell (1998) supplemented 
this opinion by adding that if the acquirer believes that combined resources will 
generate high value, the acquirer tends to be more certain about the deal. John, Liu and 
TaXer (2008) proved that premiums are on average 7-9% higher if both the acquirer 
and the target are overcon#dent about potential synergies. In general, target companies’ 
bargaining power is positively correlated with the size of the premium (Varaiya & Ferris, 
1987).
Ownership of the acquirer also has an impact on the size of the premium. Guo, 
Clougherty and Duso (2013) research showed that state-owned companies in China 
are paying higher premiums in cross-border transactions in comparison with private 
companies. 
FIG. 2. Premium determinants 
Source: Compiled by the authors
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Besides, the origin of both acquiring and target companies has an impact on the 
premium. !is is believed to exist due to the di%erences in taxation and encouragement 
policies in the countries (Hope, !omas & Vyas 2011; Bailey, Chung, & Kang, 1999). 
Hope, !omas and Vyas (2011) found that acquiring #rms from emerging economies 
in comparison with those from developed economies have a tendency to overpay in 
order to acquire assets in developed and therefore more stable economies. !e author 
a/ributes this to the national pride – developing countries see acquisition price as 
ability to make national, social, or political decisions. A few researches have been 
conducted to #nd out whether the level of internationalisation has an impact on the 
premium. According to Rustige and Grote (2010), premiums of European cross-border 
transactions in 1985-2009 were 10 percent higher, thus companies acquiring a target 
from a di%erent country are expected to pay more. However, most of the acknowledged 
researchers have focused on the acquirer’s origin, such as a region or development level 
but have not explored the di%erences in premiums paid by the acquirers from particular 
countries. 
Also, the higher stake is purchased, the higher the premium is paid. Walkling and 
Edmister (1985) estimated that on average premiums are 9% higher when the bidder 
seeks for the majority control.
Kim, Haleblianand, and Finkelstein (2011) revealed that acquirers are willing to pay 
higher premiums when the possibility of the acquiring company’s organic growth is 
low. !e same research also found out that premiums tend to be high if the acquirer’s 
advisors have relatively small experience. According to Schwert (2000), hostility in the 
takeover has some trivial in+uence on the premiums. 
!e payment method can in+uence the size of the premium as well. However, 
researchers do not have a unanimous opinion whether payment in cash or in the 
acquirer’s stock has a greater impact on the size of the acquisition premium. Damodaran 
(2011) argues that payment in the acquirer’s stock will determine larger premiums. 
!e acquirer whose stocks are overvalued will be willing to o%er a higher premium for 
the target in exchange for the acquirer’s stock (Hajbaba & Donnelly, 2013). However, 
other researchers (Pinkowitz, Sturgess & Williamson, 2013; Burch, Timothy, Nanda 
& Silveri, 2012) state that it is the opposite, and deals have a higher premium if the 
payment is in cash due to the potential tax gains. 
!ere are other forces besides the ones dictated either by acquirers or targets that 
can determine the size of a premium. According to Gould (1998), the main premium 
determinants are M&A demand and supply, trends, similar past transactions and the 
industry’s ‘rules of thumb’. In cases when there are two or more acquirers who compete 
for the acquisition of one target, the winner usually pays an enormous premium 
(Varaiya & Ferris, 1987; Andrade, Mitchell, & Sta%ord, 2001). Walkling and Edmister 
(1985) found out that premiums in such cases were about 30% higher. Imitation of 
interlock partners which have homogeneous premiums experience in+uence the 
acquirer’s willingness to pay more (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). What is more, 
when relative valuation is applied, companies are frequently looking at the market 
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multiples of the companies from the same industry (McAfee & Morley, 2010; Minjina, 
Dussauge & Mitchell, 2010). Hence if other companies in the industry tend to pay high 
premiums, it is likely that a new deal which is based on relative valuation will generate 
similar premiums. Besides, according to Hanemann and Rosen (2012), asset valuation 
+uctuates with the global growth cycles and countries with higher growth perspective 
can o%er higher premiums. All the determinants which are not in+uenced directly by 
either acquiring or target companies can be referred to as market determinants.
!e above premium drivers are the major ones discussed and analysed by researchers. 
However, as the topic is relatively new and not much research has been conducted to 
explore this area, it is likely that there are still other underlying drivers for the sizes 
of premiums. Besides, no research has been conducted to examine the interrelation 
among these di%erent premium drivers.
!is paper will mostly contribute to the research on the acquirers’ origin. !e 
#ndings by Hope, !omas and Vyas (2011) that emerging countries have a tendency 
to pay larger acquisition premiums will serve as a basis for the hypothesis about the 
di%erence in the premiums paid by Chinese and European companies. In contrast to 
Hope, !omas and Vyas (2011) research, this paper provides #ndings on the level of 
particular countries and regions. 
"e peculiarities of M&A of Chinese companies. !e reasons for Chinese 
cross-border M&A which determine the sizes of premiums can be divided into two 
categories: 1) willingness and capabilities of strong Chinese companies and 2) support 
from the government.
Peng (2012) indicates three main reasons why M&A are so popular among Chinese 
multinational companies. First, Chinese multinationals need a fast market entry, 
especially in natural resources area (Deng, 2009). To overcome branding capabilities, 
companies also tend to acquire existing world-class brands, such as recent acquisitions 
of IBM’s PC division and Volvo. CEO hubris was identi#ed as a third reason, as Chinese 
managers seek to make companies more sophisticated so that they could demand 
higher salaries (Peng, 2012). 
In 1999, the Chinese government initiated the ‘Going Global’ strategy to promote 
Chinese investments abroad and became a country which actively supports both inward 
and outward FDI (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Voss & Zheng, 2007; Guo, Clougherty & 
Duso, 2013). Favourable conditions such as a huge market size, low labour costs and 
large population let China become a dominant exporter in the world (Gao, Murray, 
Kotabe & Lu, 2010). Due to this, the country accumulated the largest portion of 
foreign reserves in the world, which accounted for US$3.4 trillion in 2012 (!e World 
Bank, 2013). By having such huge amount of reserves China could support their FDI 
activities (Luo, Xue & Han 2010). As a result, M&A became a primary mode of entering 
new markets by Chinese multinationals (Peng, 2012; Sauvant, Maschek & McAllister, 
2009).
!e government promotes outward investments, which corresponds to the country’s 
‘Going global’ strategy (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Voss & Zheng, 2007) in a few di%erent 
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formats: be/er foreign exchange rates, lower interest for #nancing the projects, reduced 
taxation etc. (Peng, 2012; Musacchio, & Flores-Macias, 2009). !e main strategic 
industries for receiving such bene#ts are natural resources (oil, gas, and minerals), 
services (e.g., banking, transportation, construction), and some industries involving 
high technologies such as computer, automobile manufacturing, and electricity power 
generation (Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013).  !ose Chinese companies which get 
the government support could a%ord a higher bid in the M&A process. However, 
Li, Li and Wen (2009) indicated that it is easier and more common for state-owned 
enterprises to get support from the government than from the private sector. !e role 
of the government in China remains high, as most shares of Chinese publicly traded 
enterprises are controlled by the government (Lau, Fan, Young & Wu, 2007). Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) sometimes have a ‘must have it’ a/itude and pay higher 
premiums. SOEs are also motivated to achieve non-commercial objectives through 
M&A thus making these acquisitions of questionable value to the company (Globerman 
& Shapiro, 2009). According to Hanemann and Rosen (2012), acquisitions made by 
SOEs account for 44% of the deals by number and 79% of the deals by value of the 
deals. On the other hand, private Chinese companies are more rational and do not pay 
such large premiums (Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013). !erefore, support from the 
Chinese government is one of the explanations of high premiums paid for the target 
companies. 
China’s 12th #ve year plan sets a framework for Chinese M&A deals. It seeks for its 
outward FDI to grow on average by 17 percent   and 7 industries are named as priorities: 
new energy, energy conservation and environmental protection, biotechnology, new 
materials, new IT, high-end equipment manufacturing, clean energy vehicles (KPMG 
China, 2011). !us, it is likely that premiums for the targets from priority industries 
will be larger. However, Chinese multinational enterprises have a particularly poor 
record of completing cross-border acquisitions that they announce (Zhang & Ebbers, 
2010). In 2000-2008 only 47% of all cross-border acquisitions announced were later 
completed, (e.g.,  67% in India) (Sun, Peng, Ren & Yan, 2011).
With the government support and Chinese companies’ willingness and capabilities 
to acquire companies in Europe, there is an underlying possibility that premiums for 
similar targets in Europe will be higher if the acquirer is a China-based company rather 
than a Europe-based company. !is would comply with the #ndings of Hope, !omas 
and Vyas (2011) that companies from emerging countries are paying larger premiums.
2. Research Methodology
!e quantitative survey was performed by using two samples: the #rst represented 
Chinese acquirers, the second involved European acquirers. Figure 3 indicates the 
summarised research scheme.
!e research is focused on 2 issues. First, it compares Chinese acquisition 
premiums with the premiums paid by European acquirers and identi#es whether there 
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is a statistically signi#cant di%erence in these premiums. Second, it investigates other 
premium determinants and their in+uence on the di%erence between the premiums 
paid by Chinese and European acquirers.
Data collection. Data for analysis was extracted from Mergemarket (a globally 
acknowledged database on M&A). !e sample of Chinese deals was based on 7 criteria: 
one for identi#cation of the acquirer, two for identi#cation of the target and four for the 
identi#cation of the deals (Figure 4). 
First of all, only those acquirers which are Chinese Mainland companies were 
included in the sample, i.e. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan were not a subject of the 
research. Targets for these acquirers had to be only Europe-based companies which 
were listed on the stock exchange (at least during the period of acquisition). 
!e time frame of 14 years (2000-2013) was set so as to exclude earlier deals 
which might have been completed under slightly di%erent conditions without the 
FIG. 3. Research scheme: comparison of the premiums of Chinese and European deals
Source: Compiled by the authors
Identi#catin of reasons for di%erence in premiums paid by Chinese and European companies
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support from the Chinese ‘Going global’ strategy. Only the deals the value of which 
was publicly announced and only the ones in which more than 10% shares had been 
acquired are included in the sample. Due to the fact that only 47% of Chinese deals 
which are announced get completed (Zhang & Ebbers, 2010), only the deals  that had 
both announcement and completion dates were included in the sample. 
In total there were 117 Chinese deals in Europe with announced acquisition 
value from 01/01/2000 to 01/01/2014. A>er application of 7 criteria, 17 deals were 
recognised as eligible for further analysis and constitute the sample.
Due to a relatively small sample size (N=17) and the fact that each Chinese 
acquisition was unique and hardly comparable, each acquisition is analysed separately. 
!erefore a comparable set of deals for each Chinese acquisition was obtained by 
applying the same 7 criteria for European acquirers, which had to be a Europe-based 
company and its target company had to operate in the same sub-industry.  In total 17 
datasets covering 139 European deals were obtained. 
Comparison of European and Chinese deals. Premiums in the database were 
computed using formula 1: 
                                                   
O%er price per share
Asquisition premium = –––––––––––––––––––– (1)
                                                   Share price at time t
FIG. 4. Criteria for the identi#cation of Chinese and European deals samples
Source: Compiled by the authors
(± one year)
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Share price at time t is a price in stock exchange 1 or 30 days before the announcement 
day. Two acquisition premiums are used: 1 day prior to the announcement day – to 
diminish the risk of taking into account events which were not related with the 
acquisition but in+uenced +uctuations of the stock price (Kim, Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
2011, Jordan & Wort, 2009), and 30 days - because this pre-acquisition stock price 
is more representative as it is not in+uenced by possible information leakage about 
potential acquisition (Reuer, Tong & Wu, 2012). !e 30 days period is widely used by 
many other researchers (Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; 
Kim, Haleblian & Finkelstein, 2011). 
!e research is composed of two parts. !e #rst part seeks to identify whether 
premiums paid by Chinese acquirers are higher than European acquisitions premiums 
for the similar type of a company in Europe and is focused on comparison of 17 
Chinese deals with 17 datasets of comparable European deals thus representing a 
purely comparative research. 
!e second part helps to identify whether there are any other factors besides regional 
ones which in+uence the size of the premiums. It complements the results gained in the 
#rst part and also tests whether premiums paid by Chinese acquirers are larger than 
those paid by European acquirers for similar targets in Europe. In the second part, 17 
datasets were aggregated into one sample and 17 Chinese deals were compared with 
139 European deals, therefore, comparability of deals was partially neglected as each 
Chinese deal was represented by a di%erent number of comparable deals. 
Before conducting parametric tests, the normality of distribution of each sample 
or dataset was examined by using the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 
signi#cance level of 95% (Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013; Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997; Kim, Haleblian & Finkelstein, 2011). 
If the hypothesis of sample distribution normality was rejected, lambda (ڣ) values 
(square root, logarithm, square) were applied to transform non-normal data into 
normally distributed data. If the transformation did not succeed to obtain normally 
distributed data, only non-parametric tests were applied.
2.1. Comparison of premiums based on comparability of targets. 
In order to compare whether premiums paid by Chinese acquirers are higher or lower 
than the mean of the premiums of comparable acquisitions by European companies, at 
#rst all 17 Chinese deals were compared with 17 datasets (based on comparability of 
targets). A>er that deeper analysis of the cases was executed. Table 2 summarises the 
methods and tools applied. !e null hypothesis in both parts is the following:
H0: Premiums paid by Chinese and European companies for similar targets in 
Europe were equal.
To test whether there is a signi#cant di%erence between the premiums paid by 
European and Chinese acquirers for similar targets in Europe, the average premium 
paid by Europe-based companies of the representing dataset was subtracted from the 
premium paid by the Chinese acquirer. Binomial test is used to measure signi#cance 
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of frequency of cases and independent samples t-test to measure whether there is a 
signi#cant di%erence between sizes of premiums. 
!e number of cases with a statistically signi#cant di%erence between the premiums 
of European and Chinese acquirers was identi#ed by conducting one sample t-tests. !e 
cases with signi#cant di%erence where divided into two groups. One group consisted of 
cases where a higher premium was paid by European acquirers and the second one was 
comprised of Chinese acquirers; a binomial test was conducted to conclude whether 
there is a signi#cant di%erence between premiums paid by Chinese and European 
companies. Chinese acquirers were found to pay larger premiums.
2.2. Comparison of premiums, partially neglecting comparability of targets
To prove that premiums paid by Chinese and European acquirers are di%erent while 
taking into account other possible factors, the set of 17 Chinese deals is compared with 
139 European deals. !e second null hypothesis to be tested was the following:
 2H0: sizes of premiums paid by Chinese and European companies were not 
signi#cantly in+uenced by other than regional factors.
 !e tests on whether there is a signi#cant di%erence between premiums in the two 
samples, and whether the premiums paid by Chinese companies and European com-
panies were correlated with potential premium determinants (the deal announcement 
date, stake in the target company, the deal value, the target country development level 
and payment method) were conducted (Table 3). Additional 2 variables were tested 
only for the European deals sample: the nature of the deal (domestic or cross-border) 
and the bidder’s country development level (developed, frontier or emerging). !e 
Kruskal Wallis Test was used to test whether the sector has an impact on acquisition 
premiums and partial correlation was used to test the correlation between the bidder’s 
region (China or Europe) and paid premiums while controlling for other 5 variables. It 
TABLE 2. Description of methods and tools used in the #rst part of the research
Comparison 
between 2 variables
Applied  tool Objective
Premiums of 17 
Chinese deals with 
premium means of 17 
European datasets
Independent 
samples t-test
To measure whether there is a signi#cant di%erence 
between sizes of premiums of Chinese and European 
companies  for similar targets in Europe
Binomial test
To measure whether the number of cases when Chinese 
premiums were higher than the mean of European 
premiums is signi#cant
Premiums in 1 
Chinese deal with 
premium means in 1 
European dataset
One sample 
t-test
To measure the number of cases where Chinese 
premium was signi#cantly higher than the mean of 
premiums of comparable European deals
Binomial test
To measure whether the number of cases when Chinese 
premiums were signi#cantly higher than the mean of 
European premiums is signi#cant
Source: Compiled by the authors
 81
helped to identify whether other factors, in addition to region, have in+uenced acquisi-
tion premiums. 
TABLE 3. Premium determinants used for correlation with premiums
Premium determinant Possible value
Correlation 
with Chinese 
companies’ 
premiums
Correlation 
with European 
companies’ 
premiums
Deal announcement date Scale from 2000 to 2013 X X
Stake in the target company Scale from 0 to 100 X X
Deal value Any number larger than 0 X X
Target country 
development level
‘1’-developed, ‘2’- frontier, 
‘3’- emerging
X X
Payment method ‘1’-in cash, ‘2’-in acquirer’s 
stock
X X
Deal nature ‘1’-domestic, ‘2’-cross-border X
Bidder country 
development level
‘1’-developed, ‘2’- frontier, 
‘3’- emerging
X
Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
3. Empirical "ndings on dissimilarity between the premiums of Chinese 
and European companies
!e results of the research conducted by using the two methods described suggest 
that premiums paid by Chinese and European companies for similar targets in Europe 
were di%erent. During 2000-2013, the average acquisition premium paid by Chinese 
acquirers was approximately two times higher than the average premium paid by 
European companies. 
 Description of the sample of Chinese deals. Most of the target companies which 
were acquired by Chinese companies are based in Western Europe (Figure 5). !is 
complies with the #ndings of Hanemann and Rosen (2012) that more than 90% of all 
Chinese acquisitions were completed in Western Europe.
FIG. 5. Distribution of the sample of Chinese deals by countries of target companies
Source: Compiled by the authors
United Kingdom
Germany
Portugal
Austria
Norway
Spain
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!e dominant sectors of target companies in the sample are mining (N=6) and 
energy (N=4) (Figure 6). !is corresponds to other research (Zhang & Ebbers, 2010; 
Hanemann & Rosen, 2012) where these sectors are indicated as the strategic ones for 
Chinese outbound investments. 
FIG. 6. Distribution of the sample of Chinese deals by sectors
Source: Compiled by the authors 
As it can be seen from Figure 7, most of the deals were announced in 2011. !e 
largest acquisitions by deal value took place in 2008. 
FIG. 7. Distribution of the sample of Chinese deals by deal value and the number of deals  
in 2000-2013
Source: Compiled by the authors 
In general, most of Chinese deals had positive acquisition premiums (Figure 8). In 
14 out of 17 deals, 30 days acquisition premiums were between 0% and 100% and in 
2 deals the premium was more than double the stock price. !e size of 30 days premiums 
varied between -32.2% and 175%. !e mean of the 1 day acquisition premium (36.6%) 
was lower in comparison with the 30 days mean (42.2%). 
!is is consistent with other research (RSM Bird Cameron, 2010), which showed 
that due to the potential information leakages, markets anticipated the acquisition 
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before its announcement date. More than 90% of deals were completed with positive 
acquisition premiums. 
Table 4 indicates that there is no evidence of signi#cant di%erence between 1 and 30 
days Chinese acquisition premiums.
TABLE 4. Paired di$erences between 1 and 30 days premiums paid by Chinese companies
 
 
 
Paired Di$erences
t df p-value
Mean
Std.  
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
95% Con#dence 
Interval of the 
Di$erence
Lower Upper
1 day 
premium –  
30 days 
premium
-0.057 0.164 0.040 -0.141 0.027 -1.436 16 0.170
Source: compiled by the authors 
!e strong positive correlation between 1 and 30 days premiums (0.952) means 
that there is no signi#cant market price +uctuation during the 30 days before the deal 
announcement day. 
Description of the sample of European deals. !e European sample (obtained 
by pooling all 17 datasets of European deals) contains 139 deals with speci#ed 1 day 
premium and 138 deals with 30 days premium (the di%erence in the number of the 
deals in two samples appeared due to the fact that one target company had not been 
listed on the stock exchange 30 days before the deal announcement date). Consistently 
with the Chinese sample, most of the European targets were located in the developed 
European countries (87%) (Figure 9). 
FIG. 8. Distribution of 1 day and 30 days Chinese premiums
Source: compiled by the authors
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Most of the acquirers in the European deals sample were located in the developed 
European countries as well (Figure 10). !e most active acquiring country is the 
United Kingdom (33 bids). Bidders from Italy and France completed 15 acquisitions 
each, while bidders from Germany, Greece and Norway closed 10 deals each.
FIG. 9. Distribution of the sample of European deals by countries of target companies
Source: Compiled by the authors
United Kingdom
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Sweden
Denmark
Switzerland
Belgium
Netherlands
Others
FIG. 10. Distribution of the sample of European deals by countries of bidder companies
Source: Compiled by the authors
United Kingdom
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Others
In the European sample, most of the deals could be referred to as domestic rather 
than cross-border deals. 92 deals were completed by bidders and acquirers which 
are from the same country and 47 deals can be named as cross-border deals. Most of 
domestic deals were completed in the United Kingdom (N=25) and Italy (N=10). 
Proportions of sectors of target companies in the sample of European deals  were 
slightly di%erent from the Chinese deals sample (Figure 11). Energy (N=43) and 
transportation (N=30) sectors were the main sectors of target companies in the 
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European sample. Mining, which in the sample of Chinese deals was the largest target 
sector, ranked third (N=22) in the sample of European deals sample. Automation was 
a dominant sector (18 deals). 
FIG. 11. Distribution of the sample of European deals by sectors of the target companies
Source: Compiled by the authors
Energy
Transportation
Mining
Industrial automation
Consumer: Retail
Consumer: Other
Utilities (other)
Leisure
FIG. 12. Distribution of the sample of European deals by value and the number  
of deals in 2004-2013
Source: Compiled by the authors
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!e total value of European deals exceeded 160 billion US dollars (Figure 12). Most 
of the deals occurred in 2008, 2011 and 2012. !e largest deals were made in 2012. 
Analysis of the pooled European deals sample showed that similarly to Chinese 
deals, most of the European acquisitions were completed with a positive premium. For 
70% of the deals premiums paid by European companies were between 0% and 50% 
(Figure 13). However, in contrast to the sample of Chinese deals, the European deals 
sample is more skewed, due to a few deals which were accomplished with extremely 
high premiums. !e largest premium paid by European acquirers was 358%, while the 
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largest Chinese acquisition premium was only 150%. A positive extreme was observed 
in the 1 day premium. !e comparison of the means of premiums complies with the 
results obtained from the analysis of the Chinese deals, which showed that the 1 day 
premium is lower than the 30 days premium, and is in line with RSM Bird Cameron 
(2010) research.
FIG. 13. Distribution of 1 and 30 days European premiums
Source: Compiled by the authors
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3.1. Empirical evidence on the di!erences in premiums 
!e results of the analysis of consolidated premiums and cases are presented to show 
whether premiums paid by Chinese acquirers were larger than those paid by European 
acquirers.
Analysis of consolidated premiums showed that in 62% of the cases the premiums 
paid by Chinese acquirers were higher than the mean of representative premiums paid 
by European acquirers (Table 5). Chinese acquirers paid more both in 1 and 30 days 
acquisition premiums more frequently. In 8 cases, both premiums paid by Chinese 
acquirers were higher than the premiums paid by European acquirers and only in  4 
cases both premiums paid by European acquirers were higher.
Table 6 summarises the results of the binomial test to measure whether the number 
of cases where Chinese paid higher premiums in comparison with European companies 
is su<cient to draw a conclusion that Chinese in general were paying higher premiums. 
Even though the observed probability for paying larger acquisition premiums is higher 
when the acquirer is a Chinese company (65% and 59% for 1 and 30 days premiums 
respectively), it provides insu<cient evidence that all Chinese deals are more frequently 
completed with higher premiums. !e binomial test provides results on the frequency 
of cases where the premium is higher/lower neglecting the size of the premiums. 
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TABLE 5.  Comparison of Chinese and European acquisition premiums
No. 
Chinese M&A Targets
Premium paid 
by Chinese 
acquirer (%)
Size of 
European 
deals  
sample
Mean of 
premiums paid 
by European 
companies (%)
Di$erence 
between 
European 
and Chinese 
premiums (pp)
Target company’s name
1 day 
pre-
mium
30 days 
pre-
mium
(N)
1 day 
pre-
mium
30 days 
pre-
mium
1 day 
pre-
mium
30 days 
pre-
mium
1
ATB Austria 
Antriebstechnik AG
1.500 1.500 28 0.204 0.296 1.296 1.204
2 Harvard International 0.364 0.161 1 0.298 0.227 0.062 -0.067
3 Sunways AG 0.267 0.597 24 0.203 0.260 0.067 0.34
4 Medion AG 0.182 0.333 13 0.483 0.258 -0.303 0.072
5 Emerald Energy Plc 0.111 0.338 10 0.438 0.033 -0.328 0.307
6 Awilco O%shore ASA 0.187 0.154 31 0.112 0.156 0.078 -0.006
7 Monterrico Metals Plc -0.119 0.336 3 -0.129 0.021 0.009 0.319
8 Kalahari Minerals Plc 0.724 0.786 3 0.210 0.169 -0.170 -0.119
9 Caledon Resources Plc 0.039 0.045 6 0.128 0.196 -0.098 -0.126
10 Faupel Plc 0.028 0.067 8 0.060 0.060 0.660 0.730
11 Oxus Gold Plc -0.322 -0.311 10 0.103 0.409 -0.423 -0.719
12 Interbulk Group Plc 1.750 1.588 16 0.361 0.298 1.389 1.292
13 REN, SGPS, S.A. 0.191 0.242 8 0.075 0.145 0.295 0.255
14 Energias de Portugal, S.A. 0.374 0.401 8 0.064 0.176 0.466 0.334
15 NH Hoteles, S.A. 0.533 0.513 1 0.423 0.587 -0.233 -0.347
16 African Minerals Limited 0.196 0.282 8 0.179 0.578 0.021 -0.298
17 Rio Tinto Plc 0.211 0.142 7 -0.039 0.066 0.249 0.074
Source: Compiled by the authors
TABLE 6. Results of the binomial test for signi#cance of the di$erence in premiums 
Who is paying a 
higher premium?
 Premium
Number of 
cases
Observed 
Proportion
Test 
Proportion
P-value
China
1 day 
premium
11 0.65
0.50 0.332Europe 6 0.35
Total 17 1.00
China
30 days 
premium
10 0.59
0.50 0.629Europe 7 0.41
Total 17 1.00
Source: Compiled by the authors
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Analysis of consolidated premiums showed that the means of Chinese and 
European acquirers’ premiums di%er by nearly 50%. !e means of the premiums paid 
by Chinese acquirers are   36.5% and 42.2% for 1 and 30 days premiums respectively, 
while the means of European acquirers’ premiums are 18.7% and 23.1%, but the results 
from independent samples t-test have indicated that there is no signi#cant di%erence 
between the means of two groups even when taking into account the sizes of the 
premiums (Table 7). 
Nevertheless, the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that with 95% 
con#dence, the levels of both 1 day and 30 days premiums are distributed normally; 
the independent samples t-test and the binomial test are not statistically reliable due to 
the very small  size of the samples, which varied between 6 and 17 companies. Due to 
the fact that the di%erence between the means is nearly 50% and the fact that tests were 
conducted for very small samples, it is very likely that, with a larger sample, statistically 
signi#cant evidence that premiums are larger will appear. However, this could only be 
possible to con#rm by either diminishing the set of criteria for the Chinese sample (e.g., 
including Hong Kong deals or deals with acquisition of less than 10% stake in the target 
company) or waiting for more Chinese deals to appear on the market in the future. 
TABLE 7. Results of independent samples t-test for signi#cance of the di$erence in premiums
 
 
 
 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of 
Means
F P-value t P-value
1 day 
prem.
Equal variances assumed 5.565 0.025 -1.322 0.195
Equal variances not assumed     -1.322 0.202
30 days 
prem.
Equal variances assumed 6.091 0.019 -1.528 0.136
Equal variances not assumed     -1.528 0.142
Source: Compiled by the authors 
Although the results showed that Chinese acquirers were paying two times higher 
premiums in comparison with European acquirers for similar targets in Europe,  it was 
not possible to prove that this di%erence in premiums is statistically signi#cant due to 
the small sample size.
Analysis of cases was used to analyse separately all the 17 cases in order to #nd 
out whether there is a statistically signi#cant di%erence between the Chinese acquirer 
and the representative sample of premiums paid by European acquirers. One-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that in 15 cases, distribution of each European dataset 
was normal, 2 Chinese deals had only 1 representative European deal. !e analysis of 
cases showed that Chinese acquirers completed the deals with signi#cantly higher 
premiums  than the acquiring European companies. One-sample t-tests presented in 
Table 8 have revealed that in 9 cases out of 15 there is statistically signi#cant evidence 
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that the mean of premiums paid by European companies is not equal to the premium 
paid by the Chinese acquirer for a similar target in Europe.
TABLE 8. Equal values of the means of European premiums and Chinese premiums 
Chinese M&A Targets
 Sample 
size
(N)
1 day premium 30 days premium
Chinese 
acquirer 
premium
Mean of 
European 
pre- 
miums
(p-value)
Chinese 
acquirer 
premium
Mean of 
European 
pre- 
miums
(p-value)
ATB Austria 
Antriebstechnik AG
28 1.500 0.204 0.000 1.500 0.296 0.000
Harvard International 1 0.364 0.298 - 0.161 0.227 -
Sunways AG 24 0.267 0.203 0.226 0.597 0.260 0.000
Medion AG 13 0.182 0.483 0.279 0.333 0.258 0.355
Emerald Energy Plc 10 0.111 0.438 0.179 0.338 0.033 0.013
Awilco O%shore ASA 31 0.187 0.112 0.196 0.154 0.156 0.987
Monterrico Metals plc 3 -0.119 -0.129 0.864 0.336 0.021 0.145
Kalahari Minerals Plc 3 0.724 0.210 0.531 0.786 0.169 0.443
Caledon Resources 6 0.039 0.128 0.142 0.045 0.196 0.103
Faupel plc 8 0.028 0.060 0.000 0.067 0.060 0.000
Oxus Gold Plc 10 -0.322 0.103 0.002 -0.311 0.409 0.025
Interbulk Group Plc 16 1.750 0.361 0.000 1.588 0.298 0.000
REN, SGPS, S.A. 8 0.191 0.075 0.000 0.242 0.145 0.000
Energias de Portugal 8 0.374 0.064 0.000 0.401 0.176 0.000
NH Hoteles, SA 1 0.533 0.423 - 0.513 0.587 -
African Minerals 8 0.196 0.179 0.870 0.282 0.578 0.359
Rio Tinto Plc 7 0.211 -0.039 0.002 0.142 0.066 0.505
Source: Compiled by the authors 
!ere is signi#cant evidence that 1 day premium was higher in 6 deals and lower in 
1 Chinese case. !e 30 days premium was signi#cantly higher in 7 cases and lower in 1 
Chinese deal. !is proves that in more than a half of cases Chinese paid higher premi-
ums than the average premium paid for a similar target company by European acquirers.
!e binomial test (Table 9) was conducted for only those cases where the di%erence 
between premiums was statistically signi#cant. In 86% of the cases Chinese were 
paying a higher 1 day premium and in 88% of cases a higher 30 days premium. At 90% 
con#dence level, there is su<cient evidence that when there is a signi#cant di%erence 
between the premiums paid by Chinese and European acquirers, Chinese are paying 
higher premiums. 
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TABLE 9. Results of binomial test for signi#cant 1 and 30 days premiums 
Who is paying a higher premium?
Number of 
cases
Observed 
Proportion
Test 
Proportion
P-value
1 day premium
Chinese acquirers 6 0.86 0.50 0.125
European acquirers 1 0.14
Total 7 1
30 days 
premium
 
Chinese acquirers 7 0.88 0.50 0.070
European acquirers 1 0.13
Total 8 1
Source: Compiled by the authors 
!is binomial test has 2 shortcomings. First of all, it only measures frequency of 
cases, neglecting the size of the premium. Second, the sample size is very small and 
because of that it is very di<cult to test any hypothesis. Supposedly, if the proportion 
of cases remains the same and the sample size increases, binomial test would show 
evidence that if there is a signi#cant di%erence between the premiums paid by Chinese 
and European acquirers, Chinese acquirers would be the ones paying higher premiums.
Summarising the results, we can state that Chinese acquirers have paid higher 
premiums in comparison with European acquirers for similar targets in Europe. Also, 
Chinese acquirers were paying larger premiums more frequently. However, the small 
sample size was the major reason why this did not always prove to be statistically 
signi#cant.
3.2. Comparison of premiums partially neglecting comparability of targets
A>er pooling 139 European deals in one sample and comparing it with the sample of 
17 Chinese deals (partially neglecting comparability), the results indicate that Chinese 
acquirers were on average paying a premium which is double the premium paid by 
European acquirers. 17 Chinese acquirers on average paid 36.5% 1 day premiums and 
42.2% 30 days premiums in comparison with 139 European acquirers who paid 18.4% 
1 day and 21.1% 30 days premiums (Table 10). 
Normality tests of samples indicate that the data from the European deals sample is 
not distributed normally. !e main reasons why the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test rejected the hypothesis of normal distribution is skewness of the data. A/empts 
to transform data into normally distributed data using lambda (λ) functions did not 
succeed. As parametric tests required normality of distribution, only non-parametric 
Wald-Wolfowitz and Median tests which are equivalent to the parametric independent 
sample t-test were conducted while analysing the pooled European deals sample. !e 
Wald-Wolfowitz and Median tests (Table 10) also show that premiums paid by Chinese 
acquirers are signi#cantly larger than premiums paid by European buyers. 
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!e results of the pooled sample are slightly di%erent from the ones obtained during 
the #rst part of the research where the di%erence in the means between the premiums 
of the deals of Chinese and European companies was not always signi#cant. !is 
di%erence might be due to enlarged number of deals in the sample, also because of the 
Median test which only measures the median, not the mean. However, both research 
methods indicated that the premiums paid by Chinese companies are twice as large as 
the average premium paid by a European acquirer. !e only di%erence was that the #rst 
research method failed to prove that this di%erence in premiums is always statistically 
signi#cant.
3.3. "e e!ect of other variables
Further research aims to identify whether there are any other factors which have 
in+uenced the di%erence between the size of the premiums paid by Chinese and 
European companies. 
As the data from the Chinese deals sample is distributed normally, a parametric 
Pearson correlation test was conducted to test whether the size of the premium is 
correlated with a year of the deal announcement, the stake in the target company or the 
deal value. It showed that none of the tested variables had a signi#cant relationship with 
the premium paid by the Chinese. Correlation coe<cients of all 3 variables were close 
to zero (Table 11). However, the sample size of 17 Chinese deals might be too small 
to reach reliable results. !us, there is no evidence that Chinese companies’ premiums 
were not in+uenced by other than regional factors. 
Other 4 variables were not tested for correlation with the premiums paid by Chinese 
acquirers because all the 17 Chinese deals in the sample included targets from developed 
European countries, the payment method was cash, and the nature of the deal and the 
bidder’s country development level was also the same.
As the data of the European deals was not distributed normally, non-parametric 
Spearman’s rho correlation was applied to test this relationship. !e correlation test 
TABLE 10.  "e comparison of the pooled European deals sample with the sample of 
Chinese deals
Acquirer N Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Wald-
Wolfowitz 
test 
p-value
Median 
 test     
P-value
1 day 
premium
European 139 0.184 0.435
0.004 0.021
Chinese 17 0.365 0.531
30 days 
premium
European 138 0.211 0.393
0.172 0.189
Chinese 17 0.422 0.487
Source: Compiled by the authors
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between the premiums paid by European companies and 7 variables showed that the 
premium size is correlated with 3 variables (Table 12): the stake in the target company, 
the deal announcement date and the payment method for the 30 days premium.
European companies’ premiums do not depend on the deal value and this complies 
with the Guo, Clougherty and Duso (2013) research as they have not found the 
relationship either between the premiums or the transaction value.
In addition, there is no relationship between premiums paid and the fact whether the 
bidder and the target was of the same origin or they were registered in di%erent European 
countries (Table 12). However, this contradicts Rustige and Grote’s (2010) research 
that Europeans usually pay approximately 10% more in cross-border acquisitions than 
in domestic ones. !is contradiction might be a result of a few reasons: #rst, in this 
research, only those cross-border acquisitions which were made within Europe were 
included in the sample. Rustige and Grote’s (2010) research covered not only Europe. 
Also, it could be due to sectoral di%erences. !e last reason could be the time frame. 
In this sample the time period is between 2004 and 2013 (to be consistent with the 
Chinese deals sample), while Rustige and Grote (2010) analysed deals which occurred 
in 1985-2009. 
!e positive relationship was observed between the premiums paid by European 
acquirers and the deal announcement date (Table 12), the more recent was the deal, the 
higher was the premium. However, this is not consistent with Mergermarket’s (2013) 
review on premiums of all M&A in Europe. According to the statistics, premiums were 
growing between 2004 and 2008 and then were quite stable in 2008-2013. Statistics 
covered all acquisitions which took place in Europe not specifying the bidder country 
or region. Besides, all industries were included in the sample. !ese are the two 
reasons explaining the slight di%erence in the relationship of premiums and the deal 
announcement dates between this research and Mergermarket (2013) results.
TABLE 11. Results of the correlation test for Chinese acquisitions
      1 2 3 4 5
1 1 day premium
Pearson Correlation 1.000
P-value .
2 30 days premium
Pearson Correlation 0.952 1.000
P-value 0.000 .
3
Year of 
announcement 
Pearson Correlation 0.097 0.022 1.000
P-value 0.711 0.934 .
4
Stake in target 
company
Pearson Correlation -0.096 -0.010 -0.200 1.000
P-value 0.713 0.968 0.440 .
5 Deal value
Pearson Correlation -0.106 -0.199 -0.280 -0.358 1.000
P-value 0.686 0.444 0.277 0.158
Source: Compiled by the authors
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TABLE 12. Results of Spearman’s rho correlation test for European acquisitions
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
 
1 day 
premium
Correlation  1.00
P-value
2
 
30 days 
premium
Correlation  0.73 1.00
P-value 0.00
3
 
Deal nature
Correlation  0.05 0.02 1.00
P-value 0.53 0.79
4
 
Stake in tar-
get company
Correlation  0.22 0.34 -0.08 1.00
P-value 0.01 0.00 0.36 
5
 
Deal value
Correlation  -0.12 0.03 0.12 -0.10 1.00
P-value 0.18 0.70 0.15 0.26
6
 
Bidder 
development
Correlation  0.05 -0.03 -0.13 0.01 -0.00 1.00
P-value 0.53 0.73 0.13 0.95 0.96
7
 
Target 
development
Correlation  0.05 0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.08 0.77 1.00
P-value 0.55 0.96 0.26 0.96 0.36 0.00
8
 
Deal announ-
cement date
Correlation 0.22 0.21 -0.12 -.070 -.047 -0.04 .039 1.00
P-value 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.41 0.56 0.62 0.66
9
 
Payment 
method
Correlation 0.12 0.20 -0.20 0.21 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 1.00
P-value 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.82 0.59 0.52 0.90
Source: Compiled by the authors
!e same positive relationship was observed between the premiums of European 
companies and the purchased stake in the target company: the larger stake was purchased, 
the higher premium was paid. !is complies with Walkling and Edmister (1985) who 
proved that the stake purchased in the target company has a positive in+uence on the 
acquisition premium. It could be associated with the bene#ts of owning the majority 
control and capability of making real changes within the acquired company. Besides, 
shareholders of the target company are expecting additional premium for abandoning 
their majority control. 
Payment method was found to have a relationship with European acquisition 
premiums as well (Table 13). Positive relationship indicated that higher premiums 
were paid for the deals with payment in equity rather than in cash. !is complies with 
Damodaran (2011) and Hajbaba and Donnelly (2013), who argue that payment in 
acquirers’ stock will determine larger premiums. However, it does not comply with 
opinions of other researchers (Pinkowitz, Sturgess & Williamson, 2013; Burch, Nanda 
& Silveri, 2012) who stated that deals have a higher premium if the payment is in 
cash due to the potential tax gains. Besides, payment method has a relationship with 
the stake purchased in the target company. Deals with a larger value tend to be paid 
in the acquirer’s stock. Also, the relationship between the payment method and the 
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nature of the deal (domestic or cross-border) was observed. More domestic deals were 
completed by paying for the target company in equity, while payment in cash was a 
more popular payment method during the cross-border deals. !is corresponds to the 
Chinese sample as all the 17 cross-border deals were paid in cash.
TABLE 13. Results of the sectors e$ect on acquisition premiums (the Kruskal Wallis test)
Target dominant 
sectors
European deals Chinese deals
Num-
ber of 
deals
1 day 
premium
30 days 
premium
Num-
ber of 
deals
1 day 
premium
30 days 
premium
Mean 
Rank
Mean
Mean 
Rank
Mean
Mean 
Rank
Mean
Mean 
Rank
Mean
Consumer  
(other)
9 60.00 0.086 51.00 0.079 2 13.50 0.885 15.00 1.050
Consumer 
(retail)
14 86.21 0.459 84.43 0.276 1 6.00 0.180 9.00 0.330
Energy 43 72.42 0.211 67.09 0.179 4 6.63 0.138 5.88 0.193
Industrial 
automation
18 80.94 0.214 85.12 0.275 1 3.00 0.030 3.00 0.070
Leisure 1 119.00 0.423 126.00 0.587 1 13.00 0.370 12.00 0.400
Mining 22 62.05 0.100 71.27 0.269 6 10.08 0.452 8.33 0.397
Transportation 30 60.10 0.090 60.83 0.185 1 15.00 0.720 15.00 0.790
Utilities (other) 2 62.50 0.068 49.50 0.068 1 2.00 -0.12 10.50 0.340
Total 139 17
Chi-Square 8.531 10.579 8.485 7.734
df 7 7 7 7
P-value 0.288 0.158 0.292 0.357
Source: Compiled by the authors 
Premiums paid by both Chinese and European companies were not signi#cantly 
in+uenced by the sector in which the target company operated (Table 13). To test the 
di%erence between premiums in 8 sectors, a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test was 
conducted, which indicated that the highest premiums by European acquirers were paid 
for targets which operate in leisure, consumer-retail, and industrial automation sectors. 
Chinese acquirers paid highest premiums for targets which operate in consumer (other), 
leisure, transportation and mining sectors. However, signi#cant di%erence between the 
means was neither observed in Chinese nor in European deals. !e Kruskal Wallis test 
provides nearly the same results.
!ere is no evidence that Chinese acquirers are paying higher premiums for the 
priority industries such as energy, mining, transportation and automation (Guo, 
Clougherty, Duso, 2013). Predominance of the deals in energy and mining sectors 
indicates that even though it is hard to prove that premiums in these sectors were 
 95
signi#cantly higher, there is evidence that Chinese companies were acquiring a 
signi#cantly larger portion of companies from priority industries.
!ere is an underlying possibility that Chinese premiums were higher than European 
premiums due to other than the regional facts. To test the e%ect of other variables on the 
correlation between the region (China or Europe) and the size of premiums, Spearman’s 
partial correlation was used (Table 14). !ose variables which are relevant to both 
Chinese and European premiums – the deal announcement date, the stake in the target 
company, the deal value, the target sector, the target country development level and 
the payment method – were controlled in a row. Two other variables, the development 
level of the bidder’s country (emerging, frontier or developed) and the deal nature 
(cross-border or domestic) were rejected due to the fact that Chinese acquisitions are 
only cross-border and the bidder’s country development level is emerging for all deals. 
!e stake in the target company, the deal value, the target sector, the payment 
method and the target country development level did not have a signi#cant positive 
in+uence on the di%erence between Chinese and European acquirers’ premiums. !e 
results in Table 14 show that when all the 5 variables were controlled, the correlation 
was even stronger than without controlling these variables. !is means that there is 
su<cient evidence that a>er elimination of any e%ect of these 5 variables, the size of the 
premiums and the bidder’s region will still correlate.
TABLE 14. Results of Spearman’s partial correlation test: e$ect of variables on correlation 
between sizes of premiums and the region
Control Variables 1 day premium
30 days 
premium
-none-a
Correlation 0.159* 0.160*
P-value 0.047 0.047
Deal announcement date
Correlation 0.151 0.152
P-value 0.061 0.060
Stake in target company 
Correlation 0.162* 0.169*
P-value 0.044 0.036
Deal value 
Correlation 0.162* 0.160*
P-value 0.044 0.047
Sector 
Correlation 0.162* 0.161*
P-value 0.044 0.046
Payment method 
Correlation 0.175* 0.189*
P-value 0.030 0.019
Target development level 
Correlation 0.165* 0.159*
P-value 0.041 0.049
Deal announcement date & stake in target 
company & deal value & sector & payment 
method & target development level
Correlation 0.176* 0.180*
P-value 0.032 0.028
*   Correlation is signi#cant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
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On the other hand, the deal announcement date seems to have slight in+uence on 
the di%erence between the premiums paid by Chinese and European companies. While 
controlling the deal announcement date, the correlation coe<cient between the region 
and size of the premiums diminished from 1.59 to 1.51 for the 1 day premium and from 
1.6 to 1.52 for the 30 days premium. Without controlling any variables, the p-value was 
0.047, thus, even a slight decrease in the correlation coe<cient would have caused a loss 
in signi#cance. !is loss in signi#cance could have been caused by slight inconsistencies 
between the deal announcement dates in the Chinese and European deals samples. 
!ere were a di%erent number of deals in each of the 17 European datasets and thus a>er 
pooling all datasets into one sample, slight dates inconsistencies might have occurred. 
However, a>er analysis of two samples, no signi#cant di%erence in announcement dates 
was observed. Most of the deals in Chinese and European samples occurred in 2011 
and 2012. Another European deals peak was in 2008, which is not consistent with the 
sample of Chinese deals. !erefore, the time frame had a slight in+uence on correlation 
between the size of the premium and the bidder’s region.
If all the variables are controlled at the same time, the correlation between the 
bidder’s region and the size of the premiums remains signi#cant. !e last row in Table 
14 indicates that while controlling for 6 variables – the stake in the target company, the 
deal value, the target sector, the payment method and the target country development 
level, which increased the correlation coe<cient, and the deal announcement date, 
which decreased correlation coe<cient – the #nal correlation coe<cient increased. 
!us, there is insu<cient evidence that correlation between the bidder’s region and 
the size of the premiums was signi#cantly in+uenced by these 6 variables. !e bidder’s 
origin is a reasonable explanation for the di%erence in the premiums paid by Chinese 
and European companies. !erefore, the previous #ndings gained through the Wald-
Wolfowitz and Median tests that there is a signi#cant di%erence between the medians 
of the Chinese and European deals  should be retained. !e results of this research 
suggest that the statistically signi#cant di%erence between the premiums of Chinese 
and European companies for similar targets in Europe does exist. 
Chinese acquirers’ willingness to pay more in comparison with the premiums of 
European acquirers for the targets in Europe could be explained by 3 main reasons: 
Chinese companies’ underlying motivational factors, support from Chinese government 
and China’s growth. 
According to Peng (2012), most Chinese companies complete mergers as they 
need a fast market entry and ability to increase branding capabilities. Also, national 
pride and managerial hubris are other major reasons for M&A as Chinese managers 
of sophisticated companies could demand higher salaries (Peng, 2012). Due to the 
underlying need for acquisitions and strong #nancial capabilities, Chinese companies 
are paying high premiums to acquire target companies in Europe and in other 
developed countries. What is more, about half of all Chinese cross-border deals were 
completed by state owned enterprises (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012). According to Guo, 
Clougherty and Duso (2013), state owned companies are frequently trying to reach 
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non-commercial objectives during the M&A and thus are paying signi#cantly larger 
premiums in comparison with Chinese private companies.
Besides, Chinese government is actively promoting outbound investment through 
its ‘Going Global’ Strategy. A Chinese company which is willing to acquire a foreign 
company could expect such bene#ts as be/er foreign exchange rates, lower interest 
for #nancing the projects or reduced taxation (Peng, 2012; Musacchio, Flores-Macias, 
2009). !is support is likely to be one of the reasons why Chinese companies could 
a%ord higher bids in the M&A process. 
According to Hanemann and Rosen (2012), asset valuation +uctuates with the 
global growth cycles, and countries with higher growth perspective can o%er higher 
premiums. As China is currently one of the fastest growing economies in the word, it 
has stronger position in bidding for the targets. As a result, M&A became a primary 
mode of entering new markets by Chinese multinationals (Peng, 2012; Sauvant, 
Maschek & McAllister, 2009). !us, these three reasons are believed to be the major 
ones in+uencing the signi#cant di%erence in Chinese and European companies’ 
acquisition premiums. 
Conclusions and suggestions 
!e primary goal of this study was aimed at identifying whether Chinese Mainland com-
panies were paying higher premiums for similar target companies in Europe during the 
period of 2000-2013 in comparison with Europe-based companies and whether it can 
be explained by other than regional factors.  To determine the di%erence between the 
premiums paid by Chinese and European companies, two samples were analysed – one 
representing all Chinese acquisitions in Europe which matched the set of criteria, anoth-
er sample representing comparable European targets acquired by European companies.
!e analysis of literature revealed that premiums paid by Chinese acquirers might be 
higher than the premiums paid by European acquirers. !e size of the premiums might 
be in+uenced by various deal-related and market-related factors such as managerial 
hubris, expected gains, origin and ownership of the acquirer, payment method, 
market trends, demand and supply etc. !e #ndings of other researchers revealed that 
companies from emerging countries tend to pay larger acquisition premiums when 
acquiring companies in developed countries and that this is particularly popular among 
Chinese companies when entering foreign markets due to the government support, 
companies’ motivational factors and expected high economic growth in China. 
Two research methods employed provided similar results and showed that Chinese 
companies were paying larger premiums compared to European companies’ premiums 
paid for similar targets in Europe. !e average Chinese premium was double the size of 
the average European companies’ premium paid for similar targets in Europe. In cases 
when there was a signi#cant di%erence in premiums among comparable Chinese and 
European deals, there was about 90% probability that a higher premium was paid by a 
Chinese acquirer.
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When partially neglecting comparability of deals, the signi#cant correlation between 
the sizes of premiums and the bidder’s region was observed. !e results proved that 
there is a signi#cant di%erence in the medians of Chinese and European premiums. 
When taking all the comparable deals, pooling them into one sample and controlling 
for other variables which might in+uence the size of premium, signi#cant di%erence 
was found between the premiums paid by Chinese and European companies. 
Even though the research which was aimed at comparison of 17 Chinese deals with 17 
comparable datasets failed to #nd a signi#cant di%erence in premiums, the comparison 
of 17 deals with a pooled European sample of 139 deals indicated signi#cant di%erence 
in premiums. !e inconsistency in the results of two studies was mainly caused by the 
sample size.
When comparability was partially neglected due to the fact that in the pooled 
sample there was a di%erent number of European deals representing a particular 
Chinese deal and partial correlation helped to control for premiums determinants 
(sector, deal announcement date, payment method, target country’s development level, 
stake in a target company and deal value), correlation between the sizes of premiums 
and the bidder’s region was present even when controlling for all the named variables. 
!erefore it could be concluded that Chinese companies were paying higher premiums 
for similar targets in Europe during 2000-2013 in comparison with European acquirers 
and this large di%erence in premiums was not signi#cantly in+uenced by other than 
regional factors.
!is study contributed to the ideas of other researchers and provided new insights 
on the topic of premium determinants. It complemented the rather outdated research 
of Walkling and Edmister (1985) and showed that sizes of premiums were in+uenced 
by the stake purchased in the target company. What it more, the research backed up 
Damodaran’s (2011) theory that premiums are higher when payment method is in 
equity, in contradiction to Pinkowitz, Sturgess and Williamson (2013) and Burch, 
Nanda and Silveri (2012) #ndings. Also, it was found out that domestic deals tend to 
be completed by paying for the target company in equity, while payment in cash was 
a more popular payment method during the cross-border deals. Research provided 
#ndings that deals with larger value tend to be paid in equity, but there is no signi#cant 
relationship between the size of the premium and the deal value. What is more, results of 
the research provided insu<cient evidence that there is a di%erence between European 
domestic and European cross-border acquisition premiums. 
 !e general trend shows that the number of Chinese acquisitions in Europe 
increases year by year. !e European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (2013) 
also forecasts a potential jump in the acquisitions. With a larger sample it would be 
possible to conduct a broader research and examine the sources and reasons for such 
di%erence further. 
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